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The Janus Face of Brussels: 
Socialization and Everyday Decision 
Making in the European Union 
Jeffrey Lewis 
Abstract This article examines the European Union's Committee of Permanent 
Representatives, or COREPER, a group composed of the EU permanent representa- 
tives (permreps) and responsible for preparing upcoming ministerial meetings of the 
Council. As the heart of everyday decision making in the EU, COREPER is a key 
laboratory to test whether and how national officials become socialized into a Brussels- 
based collective culture and what difference this makes for EU negotiations. The key 
scope conditions for COREPER socialization are high issue density/intensity and 
insulation from domestic politics. COREPER also displays a range of socialization 
mechanisms, including strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion. 
Based on extensive interview data and a detailed case study of negotiations for a 
controversial EU citizenship directive, this article documents a socialization path- 
way in COREPER marked by adherence to a set of norm-guided rules and principled 
beliefs in collectively legitimating arguments and making decisions. COREPER social- 
ization does not indicate a pattern of national identities being replaced or subsumed; 
rather, the evidence points to a socialization process based on a "logic of appropri- 
ateness" and an expanded conception of the self. 
Not many international institutional environments can match the density or robust- 
ness of collective decision-making norms found in the European Union (EU).' 
But there are surprisingly few empirical studies of how these collective norms 
operate in the EU. There is an even greater shortfall of research on the effects of 
this institutional environment on the basic actor properties of the national officials 
who participate in this system.2 How does the culture of decision making in the 
EU affect agents and their bargaining behavior? This article focuses on the Com- 
For feedback on earlier versions, I am grateful to the project participants and especially Jeffrey 
Checkel, Matthew Evangelista, Iain Johnston, and Michael Zuirn. I thank the editors and two anony- 
mous reviewers for comments that greatly improved the final product. I also acknowledge generous 
support from the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies and the American Political Science 
Association's Small Grant Program, which funded portions of field research associated with this project. 
1. For a discussion of this point, see Kahler 1995, 82-89; and Wallace 1994, 41-50. 
2. Recent exceptions include Trondal 2001 and 2002; Egeberg 2004 and 1999; Egeberg, Schaefer, 
and Trondal 2003; and Joerges and Vos 1999. 
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mittee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), a Brussels institution respon- 
sible for preparing upcoming ministerial meetings of the Council, and, as such, 
the heart of "everyday" EU decision making.3 The members of COREPER, known 
as the EU permanent representatives, are exemplars of "state agents" given their 
prominence in articulating, arguing, and defending national interests across the 
gamut of EU affairs.4 COREPER is thus a key laboratory to test whether and how 
state agents become socialized into a Brussels-based culture of EU decision making. 
COREPER is the main preparatory body for the Council of the European Union, 
the legislative heart and unabashed defender of national interests in the EU. Com- 
posed of senior civil servants and career diplomats, COREPER members meet 
weekly and have evolved a style of decision making that is rooted in a collective 
culture with its own informal norms, rules, and discourse.5 Some permanent rep- 
resentatives even joke that this collective culture makes them unpopular with home 
ministries; for example, German Ambassador Dietrich von Kyaw claimed that back 
home he was known as the stiindiger Verrater (permanent traitor) instead of the 
stdindiger Vertreter (permanent representative).6 
The central question of this article is whether and how the context and quality 
of interaction among national representatives in COREPER can have transforma- 
tive effects on basic actor properties. Unlike traditional rationalist accounts, which 
begin from the premise that institutional environments primarily affect strategy,7 
this article seeks to test constructivist claims that institutional environments can 
also affect cognition, attitudes, and identity. Rather than posing this as an "either/ 
or" question, to competitively test rationalism "versus" constructivism, this arti- 
cle asks whether the constructivist line of questioning can add value to baseline 
rationalist accounts. Based on an original data set of interviews with participants 
and case-study research of negotiation histories, this article documents how 
COREPER offers an unambiguous example of interstate negotiation in which state 
actors' range of motivations include a blend of appropriateness and consequen- 
tialist logics.8 
3. Since 1962, COREPER has met weekly in two formats: COREPER II is composed of the EU 
ambassadors and works primarily on the monthly meetings of the foreign ministers in the General 
Affairs Council (GAC); COREPER I is made up of the EU Deputies, and they preside over a wide 
range of so-called "technical" Councils such as the Environment, Fisheries, Employment and Social 
Policy, and so on. Thus, strictly speaking, COREPER consists of fifty members (twenty-five ambassa- 
dors, and twenty-five deputies) who are jointly referred to as the EU permanent representatives. For 
the more subtle differences in prestige and clout between COREPER I and II, see Lewis 2002; and 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997. 
4. There are two substantive exceptions: the Agricultural Council (which is prepared by the Stand- 
ing Committee on Agriculture [SCA]) and the Ecofin Council (prepared by the Economic and Finance 
Committee [EFC], which has its own vertical channels to the finance ministers, effectively bypassing 
COREPER). 
5. See Lewis 2000; and Bostock 2002. 
6. Dietrich von Kyaw was Germany's EU Ambassador from 1993-99. For a discussion of his Ver- 
riiter quip, see Lionel Barber, "The Men Who Run Europe," The Financial Times, 11 March 1995, 
Sec. 2, I-II. See also Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, 224-25; and Wallace 1973, 56. 
7. For examples, see Eising 2002, 87; and Bjurulf and Elgstrdm 2004. 
8. March and Olsen 1998. 
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Following Checkel's definition of socialization as "a process of inducting actors 
into the norms and rules of a given community,"9 this article tracks how 
COREPER participants exhibit a range of behavior and collectively legitimate 
arguments on the basis of a "reasoned consensus" that the logic of consequences 
by itself cannot explain. The outcome of socialization is the internalization of 
group-community standards by the EU permanent representatives (permreps), 
reflected in bargaining behavior and decision outcomes. Successful socialization, 
then, is evidenced by what Checkel calls "sustained compliance based on the 
internalization of... new norms and rules." 10 Furthermore, fine-grained analysis 
of the EU local elections negotiations (as will be discussed in the fourth section) 
will allow more nuanced discrimination between Type I (role playing) and Type 
II (normative suasion) patterns of internalization." 
Joining the COREPER "club" involves more than behaviorial adaptation to insti- 
tutional norms that alter incentives and strategies. EU permreps also internalize 
group-community standards that become part of an expanded conception of the self. 
This internalization includes a distinct epistemic value in the collective decision- 
making process itself.12 The standards of appropriateness found in COREPER 
include norms ruling out certain instrumental behavior (such as "pushing for a vote" 
under conditions of qualified majority voting), obligations to practice mutual respon- 
siveness and collectively legitimate arguments (including appropriateness stan- 
dards for dropping arguments that fail to convince the group), and a duty to "find 
solutions" and keep the legislative agenda of the Council moving forward. How- 
ever, this collective culture does not trigger shifts of loyalty or transfers of alle- 
giance. Instead, one sees a more complex layering of national and European frames. 
The interview data consistently show that EU permreps do not perceive sharp trade- 
offs between national and European allegiances. When discussing their job descrip- 
tions, permreps frequently refer to having dual personalities, performing multiple 
roles, wearing different hats, even having a "Janus face." 13 As former British Dep- 
uty Permanent Representative David Bostock explains: 
Members of COREPER describe themselves as being bound by a "dual loy- 
alty." It is their responsibility faithfully to represent their Member States; but 
it is also their responsibility to reach agreement. The Roman god Janus, fac- 
ing in two directions, is thus COREPER's patron saint, mascot, or role model.14 
Thus the identity configuration of EU permreps appears, even at first glance, more 
subtle and complex than zero-sum notions of loyalty and allegiance. In COREPER, 
9. Checkel, this volume. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid. 
12. This is compatible with what Lax and Sebenius call the development of "process interests" or 
"intrinsic interests in the character of the negotiation process itself." Lax and Sebenius 1986, 72. 
13. Author's interview, 20 February 1996. All interviews were conducted in Brussels unless noted 
otherwise. 
14. Bostock 2002, 217. 
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what one sees instead is the cognitive blurring of sharp definitional boundaries 
between the "national" and "European" frames, and a shared sense of responsibil- 
ity to deliver both at home and collectively. As this article will show, the pattern 
of socialization found in COREPER does not lead to the creation of a new over- 
arching supranational identity, but rather to a more complex configuration of iden- 
tity than is typically acknowledged. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section provides 
a concise summary of the theoretical argument. The second section details the 
pathway of socialization found in COREPER, with an emphasis on the scope con- 
ditions and mechanisms at work. The necessary scope conditions are high issue 
density/intensity and insulation from domestic politics, both of which imply that 
the socialization process in COREPER is forged by the "quality" of the link. The 
mechanisms explaining how socialization occurs in this institutional environment 
include strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion. Following this, 
the third section discusses methods and the strategy of empirical triangulation. 
Section four contains the empirical story, which traces the negotiations of a con- 
troversial EU citizenship directive that was quietly resolved by COREPER and 
sent to the ministers for formal adoption. Specifically, the case covers the 1994 
local elections directive granting all EU citizens the right to vote and run for office 
in the local elections of their current residence (that is, granting nonnational EU 
citizens local voting and participation rights). Finally, a brief concluding section 
summarizes how the identity configuration of permreps muddies conventional dis- 
tinctions between "national" and "supranational" agency. 
Overview of the Theoretical Argument 
For rationalists, identities and interests are taken as preset and given, and the empir- 
ical focus is on the role of formal decision rules, relative power, and instrumental 
rationality in explaining bargaining outcomes.15 State agents are motivated more 
by a "logic of anticipated consequences and prior preferences" 16 than by notions 
of responsibility, obligation, or informal, "soft law" rules and norms. In the ra- 
tionalists' strategic conception of rules, actors employ language and communica- 
tion as rhetorical devices to pursue instrumental interests, manipulate incentive 
structures via social influence, and so on.17 Normative compliance is the result of 
crafted, calculative reasoning and expected future benefits. While institutional envi- 
ronments have constraining and enabling effects on behavior by altering incen- 
tives, the impact of institutions on basic actor properties (attitudes, identities) is 
considered epiphenomenal. 
Constructivism relaxes the assumption of preset, given interests and identities, 
allowing for the possibility that institutional environments may have transforma- 
15. Moravcsik 1998. 
16. March and Olsen 1998, 949. 
17. See Schimmelfennig 2000; and Schimmelfennig, this volume. 
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tive effects on basic actor properties. Relative power brokering and instrumental 
rationality are accorded less primacy than in rationalism, and supplemented with 
attention to the deliberative aspects of negotiation, such as the role of discourse, 
persuasion, and the collective legitimation of arguments. According to the con- 
structivist approach, EU institutions are hypothesized to have "thick" socializing 
effects on actors, which go beyond instrumental adaptation and strategic calcula- 
tion to include the internalization of norms and rules into self-conceptions. In other 
words, the densities of institutional and normative environments are considered 
causal variables that, under the right background conditions, can have transforma- 
tive effects on basic actor properties, including how individuals see themselves 
(conceptions of the self) and how they conceptualize their interests. In the case of 
successful socialization, then, the constructivist expects to see interests that "have 
been conditioned by a community standard that delimits the acceptable." 18 As the 
case evidence will show, one can further distinguish the internalized norms argu- 
ment into Type I cases, where agents follow "socially expected behavior in a given 
setting or community," and Type II cases of accepting community norms as "the 
right thing to do." 19 
The socialization story documented here does not disprove or contradict a ra- 
tionalist reading,20 but at the same time there is abundant support for a "soft" 
constructivist account that brings the collective culture and normative environ- 
ment of Brussels-based decision making into the picture. Essentially, what one 
sees in the institutional environment of COREPER among the EU permreps is an 
expanded conception of the self that includes noninstrumental, pro-norm behavior 
without the threat of external sanctioning; it is based on the internalization of stan- 
dards of appropriateness. This can be consistent with rationalism, but it is neces- 
sary to expand the baseline of "self-interest" beyond utility maximization to include 
a wider range of egoistic and other-regarding perspectives. As such, this study 
joins a growing number of researchers who see value in developing more nuanced 
models of rationality beyond the instrumental understanding embedded in nearly 
all forms of rational choice.21 
Alternative Explanations: Internalized Norms or Diplomacy 101? 
The alternative explanation for everyday EU decision making is standard negoti- 
ation theory and two-level games analysis.22 The falsification test for the social- 
18. Hurd 1999, 397. 
19. Checkel, this volume. 
20. See Ziirn and Checkel, for a thoughtful "double interpretation." 
21. For a discussion of different "models of theoretical dialogue" between rationalism and construc- 
tivism, including the tricky issues of "paradigmatic privileging" and "first mover" advantages, see 
Jupille et al. 2003, 19-28. 
22. The literature on negotiation theory is voluminous. Classic works include Lax and Sebenius 
1986; Raiffa 1982; Ikl6 1964; Rapoport 1960; Pruitt 1981; Strauss 1978; Zartman and Berman 1982; 
and Walton and McKersie 1965. See also Jones 1994; Kramer and Messick 1995; and Rubin and Sander 
1988. On two-level games, see Putnam 1988; and Evans 1993. 
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ization story presented here is essentially: how does this differ from "diplomacy 
101"? Using standard negotiation analysis, one would not be surprised to find, 
among the EU permreps, regularized practices of mutual understanding, moderat- 
ing demands, and generalized reciprocity, especially given the scope conditions 
discussed in the next section. But according to this model, the motivations and 
incentive structures of the permreps would be firmly rooted in the consequential- 
ist logic of an instrumental conception of the self and attendant interests. Against 
this default argument, I ask whether the empirical record shows an institutional 
context in which not just a logic of consequences is in play, but a distinct logic of 
appropriateness as well. Can one find evidence of an expanded conception of the 
self among national officials, and how would this differ from "normal" unsocial- 
ized bargaining in mixed-motive games? 
To illustrate such differences, one can hypothesize four measures that would 
support the appropriateness logic and cut against the grain of conventional bar- 
gaining and two-level games analysis wedded to a logic of consequences. 
1. Noninstrumental self-restraint in demands and arguments. Unlike the instru- 
mental cost-benefit logic implicit in negotiation theory, self-restraint is now 
motivated by a sense of responsibility or obligation (especially to protect 
what Lax and Sebenius call "process" and "relationship" interests).23 Con- 
sistent with standard negotiation theory would be evidence of EU officials 
with an altered "feasibility calculus" 24 for determining what strategies work, 
including when and how to make demands and to avoid being a demandeur 
too often. However, self-restraint as it is used here involves a noncalcula- 
tive, noninstrumental rationale. Examples of self-restraint would include del- 
egations who drop demands or reservations after failing to convince the group 
of an argument. Most relevant for the alternative-explanation test is whether 
one finds instances of self-restraint that do not follow from calculative rea- 
soning (for example, "Do I have the votes?") or, especially, self-restraint where 
the option of veto or threat thereof exists. To the extent that one finds evi- 
dence supporting acts of self-restraint under such conditions, this would lend 
support to the internalized norms argument. 
2. Self-enforcing adherence to informal decision-making norms without threats 
of external sanctioning. If standard negotiation theories were on the mark, 
one would expect to see a utilitarian conception of rule-following behavior, 
supplemented by evidence of regularized cost-benefit analysis. The reason, 
as Hurd explains, is because "any loyalty by actors toward the system or its 
rules is contingent on the system providing a positive stream of benefits ... 
23. See fn. 12 for their definition of "process" interests. "Relationship" interests are those in which 
negotiators "stress the value of their relationships," which can sometimes (under iterative bargaining) 
take on "an almost transcendent status." Lax and Sebenius 1986, 72. 
24. Kerremans 1996, 232. 
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actors do not value the relation itself, only the benefits accruing from it." 25 
If the instrumental conception of rules fit here, one would also expect to see 
reliance on institutional enforcement mechanisms and formal rules govern- 
ing acceptable bargaining behavior.26 In contrast, "sustained compliance"27 
with informal norms in the absence of external sanctions and calculative rea- 
soning would support the argument that state agents negotiate from shared 
understandings of appropriate community standards.28 
COREPER norms are informal and self-enforcing29 because adherence to 
them is considered the "right thing to do," as part of the permreps' princi- 
pled commitment to collective decision making.30 The reflex to make deci- 
sions by consensus is a classic example of this and a durable practice viewed 
by the EU permreps as the "right thing to do" regardless of the formal 
decision-rule. One ambassador claimed that the "consensus-seeking assump- 
tion ... penetrates, in my mind, everything we do." 31 The mode of social 
control in COREPER is compatible with Hurd's legitimacy model, in which 
it is "noncompliance that requires of the individual special consideration and 
psychic costs," and in which "the internalization of external standards can 
... defuse Olsonian problems of collective action by causing actors to inter- 
pret the mutually cooperative option as also being the individually rational 
one."32 Or as Wendt puts it, "external constraints become internal con- 
straints, so that social control is achieved primarily through self-control." 33 
Evidence of self-enforced informal norms without the threat of external sanc- 
tions and constraints would support the noninstrumental appropriateness logic. 
3. Empathy and other-regarding behavior not linked to calculative reasoning. 
The alternative explanation would expect to find empathic behavior linked 
25. Hurd 1999, 387. 
26. For example, one would expect to see wide recourse to formal rules such as the 1994 Ioannina 
Compromise, which holds that under conditions of qualified majority voting when a clear blocking 
minority does not exist (but at least twenty-three to twenty-five votes oppose), the Council will still 
"do all within its power" to find a "satisfactory solution." Dinan argues that the Ioannina Compromise 
was a "face-saving device" for "anti-EU" back-benchers in the British parliament and has "had no 
practical impact on EU decisionmaking." Dinan 1998, 299. For a similar argument-that the impact of 
the infamous 1966 Luxembourg Compromise to protect "vital national interests" has been highly exag- 
gerated and largely unimportant for bargaining outcomes-see Golub 1999. 
27. See Checkel, this volume. 
28. Although it should be added here that evidence of this measure may be compatible with either 
Type I or Type II internalization. Additional tests are needed to measure the degree of "taken-for- 
grantedness." A useful index to operationalize the distinction used here is the discussion in Hurd 1999 
of "habitual" versus "holistic" internalization. 
29. See the "Socialization Mechanisms" section below. 
30. See also Gheciu, this volume, in which she codes successful socialization as cases where norms 
are accepted because they are considered normal and "the right thing to do" is to comply with them; 
norms are not accepted just because they are directly linked to instrumental rewards. 
31. Author's interview, 18 March 1997. 
32. Hurd 1999, 388-89. 
33. Wendt 1999, 361. 
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to instrumental calculations, and in an issue-intensive, in-camera setting such 
as COREPER, this would be based on both longer time horizons (for exam- 
ple, "I may need help next week") and reputational concerns. But the inter- 
nalized norms argument expects to see acts of empathy and other-regarding 
behavior based on a different kind of calculus. The difference from the con- 
sequentialist logic is that the internalized norms model expects such acts to 
be what Wendt calls "self-binding" or "unilateral initiatives with no expec- 
tation of specific reciprocity." 34 Evidence supporting the internalized norms 
argument would include examples of empathy not linked to an instrumental- 
ist conception of interests but seen as "the right thing to do." 
More specifically, evidence for Type II-internalized norms-socialization 
would include those cases in which national representatives worked to con- 
vince superiors back in the capitals to accept another delegation's plea or argu- 
ment while dropping their own, even when veto options existed. This practice 
would be coded as normative suasion because actors who are persuaded by 
another's argument then defend the position to their authorities, seeking to 
convince those authorities to accept the reasoning while at the same time drop- 
ping their own unconvincing claim. In other words, these actors are success- 
fully persuaded to change positions, and this carries potential costs to 
implement (that is, they risk the ire of the capital). Especially relevant for the 
collective community standards argument are those cases in which the group 
actively "plots" solutions to overcome domestic reserves, sometimes faking 
group outrage or artificially simulating a delegation's isolation on a position.35 
But the empathy indicator is also clearly a case in which it is misleading 
to frame the question as "rationalism versus constructivism," as both schools 
offer similar predictions. Indeed, Keohane discusses several different ways 
that states can interpret self-interests "empathetically," some of which are con- 
sistent with standard bargaining (this would include other-regarding behav- 
ior he terms "instrumentally interdependent" and "situationally 
interdependent") and some of which are more akin to the internalized norm 
conception (for example, what he calls "empathetic interdependence").36 
4. Limits on instrumentalism through the collective legitimation of arguments. 
Such acts would be especially relevant-and contrary to standard negotia- 
tion predictions-where delegations drop demands after failing to convince 
the group, despite a theoretical recourse to the threat or use of veto under the 
unanimity decision-rule. Evidence that standards of appropriateness exist can 
be seen in cases where group outrage is used to signal that certain things are 
just not acceptable. One can further contextualize the internalized norms argu- 
ment into Type I cases in which agents follow "socially expected behavior 
34. Wendt 1999, 362. 
35. For a discussion of "plotting" practices in COREPER, see the "Mechanisms" section below. 
36. Keohane 1984, 120-25. 
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in a given setting or community" and Type II cases of accepting community 
norms as "the right thing to do,"37 a point returned to in the fourth section, 
below. But in general, both variants deviate from the alternative explanation 
of standard negotiation by their noninstrumental, noncalculative motivations. 
The Pathway of Socialization in COREPER 
COREPER is "responsible for preparing the work of the Council and for carrying 
out the tasks assigned to it by the Council." 38 From this austere legal basis, 
COREPER has evolved into a major player in the EU system. Among its "assigned 
tasks" is the remit to "coordinate the work of the various Council meetings and to 
endeavour to reach agreement at its level."39 In essence, this means that COREPER 
holds responsibility for the performance of the Council as a whole. Permreps claim 
that this responsibility is an implicit part of the job description. As one ambassador 
put it, "there is a high collective interest in getting results and reaching solutions. 
This is in addition to representing the national interest." 40 Another claimed to have 
an unwritten, global, permanent instruction to "find solutions."41 Whatever the case 
and as these quotes suggest, logics of appropriate behavior and socialization dynam- 
ics seem evident within COREPER. The analytic challenge is to establish their scope 
conditions and mechanisms of operation, tasks to which I now turn. 
Scope Conditions 
Issue density/intensity. COREPER's structural placement imparts a coherence 
and continuity in the representation of interests that would otherwise be difficult 
to match. In terms of structural location, COREPER occupies a unique institu- 
tional vantage point in the EU system. Vertically placed between the experts and 
the ministers and horizontally situated with cross-sectoral policy responsibilities, 
the permreps have a general overview of the Council's work. Relative to the experts 
meeting in the working groups, they are political heavyweights; but compared to 
the ministers, they are both policy generalists and experts in the substantive ques- 
tions of a file. 
Since the Council's work is based on a concept of sectoral differentiation, pur- 
suing the "national interest" across its sixteen or so formations requires national 
systems of interest intermediation and interministerial coordination that are com- 
plex even for the smallest member states or those with the most centralized EU 
37. Checkel, this volume. 
38. Art. 207, Treaty on European Union. 
39. Council of the European Union 1997, 39. 
40. Author's interview, 12 July 1996. 
41. Author's interview, 20 February 1996. 
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affairs machinery. It is here that the permreps in COREPER, with their cross- 
Council negotiating mandates and intersectoral policy responsibilities, practice an 
essential aggregation function. A central feature of COREPER's institutional envi- 
ronment is the density of issues and issue-areas that are covered in the agendas of 
the weekly meetings. No other site of everyday EU decision making approximates 
the intensity of weekly COREPER negotiations (measured in terms of the number 
of weekly agenda items and the horizontal nature of these agendas). Thus the agen- 
das of COREPER meetings are qualitatively different than the type encountered at 
the Council working group level. Unlike the "contact thesis" then, which equates 
socialization with the amount of interaction,42 the pattern discerned here is con- 
tingent on the density and quality of interactions. 
Not only is COREPER distinguished by the intensity of negotiations, but the 
permreps' involvement across the different domains of EU decision making is per- 
vasive as well. In addition to the regular cycle of weekly meetings, the permreps 
sit beside their ministers during Council sessions, briefing them and offering tac- 
tical suggestions. Permreps attend European Council summits and can serve as 
behind-the-scenes consultants. The growth of codecision (now considered the EU's 
"ordinary" legislative procedure) has also created an intense negotiation forum 
between members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and the deputy permreps 
who represent the Council.43 
Reinforcing the intensity of interactions, the EU permreps also accumulate 
a great deal of experience through long periods of participation.44 The average 
tenure is five years, slightly longer than the typical three- or four-year diplo- 
matic rotation.45 But some permreps remain in Brussels for much longer, 
upwards of a decade or beyond. Another reinforcement mechanism is the 
COREPER luncheon, held by COREPER II before the monthly General Affairs 
Council (GAC) and sometimes on a more topical, ad hoc basis. Lunches are fre- 
quently used to tackle the thorniest of problems, since attendance is heavily 
restricted, no notes are taken, and not even translators are present.46 There are 
also informal COREPER trips, hosted by the presidency, that precede European 
Council summits. 
In sum, the first scope condition is COREPER's unique structural position in 
everyday EU decision making, with a brand of intensity that is generated by the 
density and scope of agendas and widespread participation in nearly all aspects of 
the Council's work; this is reinforced by extensive periods of interaction and numer- 
ous informal venues for negotiation. This scope condition can also be restated in 
hypothesis form: 
42. See Checkel, this volume. 
43. Bostock 2002. 
44. See Checkel, this volume, for a discussion of the methodological problems in conflating the 
intensity and duration of interaction. 
45. Lewis 1998, 111-13. 
46. Butler 1986, 30. 
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HI: The internalization of new role conceptions and conceptions of the self in line 
with group-community norms is more likely when individuals are in settings where 
contact is intense and sustained. 
Insulation. One of the central features of COREPER diplomacy is a high degree 
of insulation from the normal currents of domestic constituent pressures. The meet- 
ings themselves are treated with an air of confidentiality, and many sensitive 
national positions are ironed out in restricted sessions in which the permreps clear 
the room and can speak frankly and in confidence that what is said will not be 
reported to the capitals or the media. This often includes group discussion on 
how an agreement will be packaged and sold to the authorities back home. 
"At our level, publicity does not exist," an ambassador explained, "Our body 
is absolutely black; we can do deals.""47 The norms of insulation are so devel- 
oped that national experts from the capitals are not allowed to attend COREPER 
meetings at all (one official referred to them as "spies," another called them 
"the watchdogs" who "are not allowed in the room").48 The role of insulation 
in COREPER diplomacy supports Checkel's hypothesis49 that persuasion and 
socialization are more likely in "less politicized and more insulated, in-camera 
settings." 
A structural feature of COREPER that often goes unnoticed is that insulation 
affords member states the capacity to reshape domestic constraints. As an ambas- 
sador put it, "COREPER is the only forum in the EU where representatives don't 
have a domestic turf to defend." Because of this, he went on to add, "it is often 
politically necessary to present a position knowing it is unrealistic. My minister of 
finance needs certain arguments to be presented. He has certain pressures from his 
constituencies. We have to make it look like we fought for this even though we 
both know it will lead nowhere. I will present it, and if it receives no support, I 
will drop it." 50 Along with insulation comes a high degree of input ("voice") in 
the instruction process, including how arguments/interests are articulated and 
defended. The degree of voice that the permreps can obtain stems from COREPER's 
basic mission to find solutions and keep the work of the Council moving forward. 
One intriguing argument as to why states would choose to create such a highly 
insulated body comes from recent work by Stasavage. Using a rational choice frame- 
work, he shows how "open-door bargaining" and greater levels of transparency 
can increase "posturing" by negotiators, since they have built-in incentives to 
present unyielding positions "in order to demonstrate to their constituents that they 
are effective or committed bargainers."51 
47. Author's interview, 23 May 2000. 
48. Author's interviews, 23 May 2000; and 18 April 1997. 
49. See Checkel, this volume. 
50. Author's interview, 15 May 2000. 
51. Stasavage 2004, 673. 
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Domestic insulation has enabled the permreps to develop de facto decision- 
making capabilities.52 The best empirical indicator of the weight of COREPER's 
decision-making role is the prolific "A-point" procedure. A-points are "agreed 
points" (that is, issues agreed to within COREPER) that are passed en bloc and 
without discussion by the ministers at the beginning of each Council session.53 
Even for files marked as B-points (that is, issues sent to the ministers that require 
further discussion), the input of COREPER should not be ruled out. In many cases, 
detailed negotiations have already taken place in COREPER (see the case study 
below for an example). It is remarkable, in fact, that COREPER's burgeoning de 
facto decision-making power has escaped every post-Maastricht "democratic def- 
icit" revision unscathed, entirely on the rather thin reed that only ministers have 
juridical decisional authority. 
To summarize, the second scope condition for COREPER socialization is 
insulated-from both domestic constituencies and domestic line ministries- 
negotiation, coupled with de facto (as opposed to juridical) decision-making author- 
ity. This can be restated as follows: 
H2: The internalization of new role conceptions and conceptions of the self in line 
with group-community norms is more likely when individuals are in private, in- 
camera settings with a high degree of domestic insulation. 
Having identified the key conditions under which to expect socialization, I turn 
now to the major factors that explain how this process occurs and how it can lead 
to shared understandings of appropriateness-understandings that produce behav- 
iors different from those based on instrumental and utilitarian calculations alone.54 
Socialization Mechanisms 
Strategic Calculation and Role Playing: Adherence to Informal Norms. A 
distinctive feature of COREPER's institutional environment is a robust set of dura- 
ble yet unwritten and purely informal decision-making norms. One of the most 
striking aspects of these informal norms is their seemingly "self-binding" nature 
(Wendt's term). Why do national representatives comply? The interview data 
strongly suggests that COREPER participants practice pro-norm behavior (in the 
absence of external sanctioning) because it leads to the acquisition of social influ- 
ence and diffuse, intangible "social capital." 5 As a mechanism of socialization, 
52. The permanent representatives have no formal decision-making authority. Juridical decision- 
making authority is a power exclusively reserved for the ministers, and formal voting is expressly 
prohibited at any other level of the Council (compare Art. 7[1] of the Council's Rules of Procedure). 
53. Recent studies of the Council have documented the growth and importance of the A-point pro- 
cedure in the EU legislative process. See, for example, van Schendelen 1996; and Gomez and Peterson 
2001. 
54. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this language. 
55. For a discussion of "social capital," see Putnam 1993, 169-70. 
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behaviorial adaptation to acquire social influence is what this volume would code 
as strategic calculation.56 
The explanation does not end there, however. To get what you want in 
COREPER, you must also subscribe to socially accepted standards of behavior. 
Evidence of this pattern would support what this volume calls Type I internaliza- 
tion or role-playing socialization. These informal norms act as cognitive markers 
for newcomers to adapt to the group's accepted standards. As I will show below 
in the case of Austria's "opt-out" argument, the group can reject arguments with 
exaggerated ferocity to shame capitals and pressure a change in national demands. 
Group outrage is used to signal that certain behavior and justification for demands 
is simply not done or is not acceptable. 
Five informal norms stand out. First, there is a norm of diffuse reciprocity, or 
the diffuse balancing of concessions over an extended shadow of the future.57 Dif- 
fuse reciprocity can take many forms, including' concessions and derogations, or 
"going out on a limb" to persuade the capital for changes or a compromise. Drop- 
ping reserves or abstaining (rather than voting "no") are also political gestures 
that can be filed away and later returned in kind. 
Second, there is a norm of thick trust and the ability to speak frankly, which is 
reinforced by weekly meetings, trips, and lunches. Thick trust is especially impor- 
tant during endgame negotiations or restricted sessions when the "real knives come 
out on the table.""8 Third, there is a norm of mutual responsiveness that is best 
described as a shared purpose to understand each other's problems. Knowing and 
understanding each other's interests and arguments is a key to "receiving under- 
standing from the group."59 Mutual responsiveness is a form of collective legiti- 
mation, wherein arguments or pleas for special consideration are collectively 
accepted or rejected by the group. The fourth norm is a consensus-reflex. This is 
what Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace refer to as "the instinctive recourse to behave 
consensually." 60 Although systematic empirical data is lacking because of the con- 
fidentiality of negotiations, participants claim that the overwhelming bulk of deci- 
sions are made consensually. Even under conditions of qualified majority voting 
(QMV), permreps often spend extra time to "bring everyone on board." Pushing 
for a vote is considered inappropriate in most cases, and the "consensus assump- 
tion" is a reflexive habit.61 
Finally, there is a culture of compromise premised on a basic willingness to 
accommodate divergent interests and reinforced by the other norms listed above. 
This culture is facilitated by the "dynamic density" of COREPER's work and the 
56. See Checkel, this volume. 
57. See Keohane 1986 for the classic treatise on "diffuse reciprocity." 
58. Author's interview, 14 March 1996. On the concept of thick trust, see Putnam 1993, 167-71. 
59. Author's interview, 17 February 1997. 
60. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1995, 465. 
61. Author's interview, 18 March 1997. 
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horizontal nature of agendas. The normative effects of this culture include a self- 
restraint in the calculations and defense of interests, seen for example when del- 
egations quietly drop reserves after failing to convince the others of their arguments. 
Taken together, these informal norms are widely practiced and firmly institu- 
tionalized in COREPER's organizational culture.62 As the case study of local elec- 
tions negotiations will show, adherence to these norms cannot be explained by 
either a pure incentive-based (consequentialist) or normative (appropriateness) logic, 
but instead represents a subtle blending of the two. That is, pro-norm behavior is 
rooted in a complex combination of both strategic calculation and role-playing 
socialization. Which came first, and how these normative scripts became institu- 
tionalized into COREPER routines, remains largely to be told. 
Normative suasion. COREPER has its own locution, with signals, key phrases, 
and unspoken meaning. There is also a certain element of theatricality, in manu- 
facturing intrigue; how else could one sit through yet another round of fishing 
quotas, as one permrep alluded. All of this is the typical grammar of diplomats, 
to be expected in issue-intensive, insulated settings where negotiators develop 
long-term interpersonal relationships. Going further though, one also sees a wide 
range of discursive resources that permreps can use in presenting and collec- 
tively legitimating arguments. This real possibility for normative suasion is what 
separates COREPER from the alternative argument of "normal" interstate nego- 
tiation. For example, as the local election case study will show, COREPER is 
considered the EU's locus classicus for "opt-out" negotiations, since permreps 
use collective legitimation to determine who warrants special consideration backed 
by standards of fairness where persuasive justifications carry the day (rather than 
relative power, voting weights, or the decision-rule). Evidence of this pattern would 
tend to support Checkel's hypothesis63 that socialization is more likely where 
agents do not "lecture or demand" but rather act on "principles of serious delib- 
erative argument." 
Learning the derogation discourse is an important tool of the trade in COREPER, 
and senior permreps develop idiosyncratic methods for signaling when they need 
special dispensations. For many, this includes having a sense of humor when iso- 
lated or when national political sensitivities are being discussed. Normative 
suasion is an important socialization mechanism in COREPER, and unlike the 
mechanism of strategic calculation, it is sustained over time without respect to the 
structure of incentives or the existence of external sanctions. But argumentative 
resources are intertwined by consequentialist and appropriateness logics, and it is 
often difficult to tease the two motivations apart. 
Put differently, in COREPER, arguments matter. While a truism in almost any 
type of negotiation, there are no comparable sites within the Council where the 
62. See Noel 1967; and Lewis 2003. 
63. See Checkel, this volume. 
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persuasive power of one's arguments weighs on outcomes.64 Representatives claim 
that they come prepared to convince and be convinced by others, and many of the 
weekly meetings are geared toward reaching a "reasoned consensus" rather than a 
vote.65 Arguing and persuasion are also seen in how the permreps signal that some- 
thing is particularly important or request mutual understanding from the group 
(irrespective of the formal decision-rule). 
Participants claim that even in rare instances when they do vote, it is excep- 
tional that this is done without the consent of the "no's.",66 In COREPER, the 
power of a good argument can be as compelling as a blocking minority or the 
shadow of the veto. The possibility of persuading others with a convincing argu- 
ment and the norms of mutual responsiveness work as a great equalizer in 
COREPER negotiations. As a result, smaller member states who articulate sound 
arguments and/or clearly explain their positions can often punch above their 
weight. According to one participant, "If you convince others, it's with good argu- 
ments. Big or small makes no difference. In fact, the big member states often 
have higher burdens of proof in order to convince the others."'67 Another example of normative suasion is how permreps engage in the collec- 
tive "plotting" of agreements.68 Plotting is a negotiation pattern in COREPER that 
demonstrates how a collective rationality can reformulate individual, instrumental 
rationality. The basic function of plotting is using the group to redefine a national 
position or to reshape domestic constraints.69 "To get new instructions we have to 
show [the capital] we have a black eye," an ambassador explained, "We can ask 
COREPER for help with this; it is one of our standard practices." 70 According to 
another, "Sometimes I will deal with impossible instructions by saying, 'Mr. Chair- 
man, can I report back the fierce opposition to this by the fourteen others?' And 
sometimes fierceness is exaggerated for effect."71 Exaggerating the fierceness of 
opposition is thus a group strategy to collectively legitimate or reject arguments. 
A clear illustration of this practice is seen below in the way the group handles 
Austria's claim for special treatment. 
In general, as standard negotiation theory explains, plotting and underlining oppo- 
sition are tools of the trade to deal with recalcitrant bargaining positions. But in 
64. But see Puetter's 2003 analysis of the Eurogroup Council as a deliberative process based on a 
"shared normative framework." 
65. Although it is important to emphasize here that EU permreps, without exception, stress the 
importance of the decision-rule in contextualizing negotiations. It is a cliche in COREPER that qual- 
ified majority voting is the surest way to reach consensus. 
66. Author's interviews, 15 May 2000; and 12 July 1996. 
67. Author's interview, 29 May 2000. Based on survey data of 218 national officials in the EU, 
Egeberg, Schaefer, and Trondal find that influence on committees is considerably higher among those 
with demonstrable expertise than those from big states per se. Egeberg, Schaefer, and Trondal 2003, 
28, tab. 11. 
68. See Lewis 2002, 292, for an example. 
69. Two-level games researchers call this "COG collusion." Evans 1993, 406-7. 
70. Author's interview, 15 May 2000. 
71. Author's interview, 26 May 2000. 
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COREPER, this takes on an additional layer of collective legitimation as a frame- 
work of shared meaning within the standards of appropriateness. As Risse argues, 
in a "collective communicative process" actors are engaged in determining "whether 
norms of appropriate behavior can be justified, and which norms apply under given 
circumstances."72 This is a hallmark of COREPER's role in the EU system, and 
viewed from the process level of everyday decision making, the stamp of collec- 
tively negotiated standards of appropriateness is unmistakable. In the case of local 
elections (see below), this can be seen in how the permreps deliberate derogation 
requests against a principled commitment for maximal interpretation of "equal treat- 
ment" standards in EU voting rights. 
Methods and Data 
My research design follows a methodological strategy of "empirical triangula- 
tion" combining several qualitative and quantitative data sources: semi-structured 
interviews, archival documentation (Council documents such as the travaux pre- 
paratoires, press releases, agendas, and so on), and secondary sources. My pri- 
mary data sources are semi-structured interviews with COREPER participants. To 
date, I have conducted 118 interviews at the permanent representations and with 
regular COREPER participants from the Commission and the Council General Sec- 
retariat (CGS).73 Interviewing took place in four rounds over a seven-year period.74 
Controlling for Prior Exposure and Self-Selection 
Three methods were used to limit potential measurement problems, such as prior 
exposure to EU decision making. First, interview subjects were asked direct ques- 
tions about their initial participation in COREPER negotiations, how they articu- 
lated their written instructions, and what, if any, changes occurred over time. 
Second, the interviews sampled "newcomers" at two levels: individual partici- 
pants and new member states (both Nordic and Central/Eastern European new- 
comers are included in the sample). Third, I was able to re-interview some 
participants at a later date and compare their responses. 
Several generalizable patterns emerged. The interviews track similar learning 
curves for newcomers, even those with different backgrounds and from different 
national administrative cultures. Participants typically claim that when they began 
attending the Committee, they learned that defending instructions alone had lim- 
72. Risse 2000, 7. 
73. The sample includes: thirty-one permanent representatives (eighteen ambassadors and thirteen 
deputies), thirty-two top advisors to the permreps (known as the "Antici" [COREPER II] and "Mertens" 
[COREPER I] counselors), thirty policy specialists, nine legal advisors, ten officials in national capi- 
tals, and six others. 
74. Specifically, February-July 1996, February-April 1997, May 2000, and May-June 2003. 
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ited effectiveness.75 This involves more than learning just strategy; effectiveness, 
according to participants, includes developing a sense of self-restraint and the abil- 
ity to balance the specific instructions on a single file with more global instruc- 
tions to keep the work of the Council moving forward. 
Another pattern is that newcomers initially tend to view their counterparts as 
rivals. "I saw my colleagues as opponents at first," one deputy commented.76 
Another claimed, "Early in our membership we acted tough and we had these posi- 
tions, 'Others don't like it, too bad.' But the politicians back home learned fast to 
be prepared to compromise. Now we are known as a country others can turn to for 
a compromise."77 On balance, the evidence suggests that newcomers have rela- 
tively high levels of ingrained cognitive priors, which supports Checkel's hypoth- 
esis78 that under such conditions there will be greater resistance to normative 
suasion. The COREPER novice who "treats colleagues as opponents" undergoes a 
period of social learning (and mimicry) during which they adopt new cognitive 
templates in order to operate in an unfamiliar environment. Some newcomers recall 
receiving extra patience and understanding from the group; a permrep from one of 
the newer EU member states commented, "They [COREPER] gave [us] and the 
new member states special patience, but now I think that's over."79 
In summary, while no guarantee against potential measurement bias, the built-in 
controls of triangulation, newcomer sampling, and re-interviewing help to mini- 
mize such effects. More importantly, they strengthen the case for the independent 
causal influence of socialization dynamics within COREPER. To directly test the 
four socialization measures spelled out in section two, the argument now shifts to 
an examination of the 1994 local elections directive, a controversial and politically 
unpopular extension of voting and participatory rights for EU citizens. With this 
directive, for the first time, the EU allowed citizens from any member state to vote 
and run for office in municipal elections based on wherever they resided in the EU.80 
Socialization in COREPER: The Case of the 1994 
Local Elections Directive 
The EU foreign affairs ministers, meeting in the GAC, adopted a directive on 
the right to vote and run for municipal elections on 19 December 1994.81 The 
75. One common response was that following written instructions alone (that is, just reading from 
them) was a sure way to be left out of the discussion. 
76. Author's interview, 17 March 1996. 
77. Author's interview, 14 March 1996. 
78. See Checkel, this volume. 
79. Author's interview, 14 March 1996. 
80. Numerically, the directive enfranchised approximately 5.3 million EU citizens living in another 
EU-15 member state. Lewis 1998, tab. 5-2, 215. 
81. Council Directive 94/80/EC. The full title is the directive "[L]aying down detailed arrange- 
ments for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens 
of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals." Official Journal L 368/38, 
31 December 1994. 
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substance of this directive had already been agreed upon twelve days earlier in 
COREPER. Negotiations were intentionally kept out of the GAC and the ambas- 
sadors were encouraged to reach an agreement in COREPER that could then be 
formally rubber-stamped by the ministers. 
The local elections directive covered sensitive domestic political issues of elec- 
toral and citizenship laws, requiring the majority of member states to pass consti- 
tutional amendments to extend rights to "nonnational" EU citizens. The directive 
effectively established a principle of equal treatment between national and nonna- 
tional EU citizens. Moreover, the principle of equal treatment was agreed upon at 
a level of maximum coverage, with a minimalist interpretation of acceptable national 
"opt-outs." The principle of equal treatment agreed to in COREPER even went 
beyond earlier Commission proposals that considered minimum residency require- 
ments a prerequisite for expanding local voting rights to Community nationals.82 
During negotiations, several delegations (including Denmark, France, the Neth- 
erlands, and Sweden) initially voiced preferences for maintaining residency require- 
ments that already existed in national law (see Table 1). However, the final terms 
of the directive allowed minimum residency rules in Luxembourg and, on an 
extremely limited basis, in Belgium. It was a shared understanding among the EU 
permreps that "opt-outs" would have to meet high standards for justification because 
of the potential for derogations to water down the scope and application of local 
voting rights. From the earliest discussions in COREPER, there was an informal 
and sometimes shifting majority of members who defended the need for equal 
treatment between national and nonnational EU citizens. Counterfactually, the argu- 
ment presented here is that minus socialization, the final outcome would have been 
very different-if agreement would have been reached at all. 
Explaining the Local Elections Negotiations: Testing the 
Alternative Explanation 
This article contends that everyday EU decision making is not all about relative 
power, formal decision-rules, and instrumental interest calculations. If it were, the 
alternative argument is that bargaining behavior and everyday outcomes can be 
explained with standard negotiation theory and two-level games analysis. How- 
ever, if the alternative explanation was correct, one would expect to see a very 
different sequence of bargaining behavior leading to a different kind of outcome 
than what occurred in this case. First, although at least four delegations (Den- 
mark, France, Greece, and Austria) were interested in derogations and could have 
credibly linked such claims to the "shadow of the veto", none did. Moreover, after 
82. The Commission's position was for minimum residence at least equal to the term of local 
office to vote, and double the term of office in order to stand for election. European Communities 
Bulletin 9-1986, 44. In effect, this would apply the Luxembourg derogation (see discussion below) to 
the entire EU. 
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TABLE 1. National legislation governing municipal elections 
Existing national legislation before the 1994 Member state Basis for electoral rights local elections directive 
Ireland Residence All nonnational residents eighteen years and older, 
who have lived in Ireland for at least six months can 
vote and run for office in local elections (1973 Elec- 
toral Act, right to vote; 1974 Electoral Act, right to run 
for office). 
Denmark Residence Since 1977, the right to vote and run for local office 
has been extended to nationals of the Nordic Union 
(Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Norway) who are eighteen 
years or older and have met minimum residency 
requirements (Law of 18 May 1977). 
In 1981, these rights were extended to all nonnationals 
(Law No. 143 of 30 March 1981 Amending the Law 
Governing Municipal Elections and by Decree of the 
Minister of the Interior No. 196 of 22 April 1981). 
Netherlands Residence In 1983, Article 130 of the Constitution was amended 
to allow all nonnationals the right to vote and run for 
office in local elections, subject to a minimum resi- 
dency requirements. 
Britain Residence and nationality The right to vote and run for office in local elections is 
extended to Irish nationals and Commonwealth citi- 
zens who are over the age of eighteen (to vote) or 
twenty-one (to stand as candidate) and have met mini- 
mum residency requirements. 
Spain Nationality Since 1985, the right to vote in local elections (but not 
to stand as a candidate) can be extended to nonnational 
residents by treaty or law on a reciprocal basis (Article 
3 of the General Electoral Law of 19 July 1985). 
Portugal Nationality Since 1982, nationals of a Portuguese-speaking coun- 
try may be given the right to vote in local elections by 
treaty or by law on a reciprocal basis. Only one such 
agreement was reached, with Brazil, extending the 
right for Brazilian nationals to vote in local Portuguese 
elections after having lived in Portugal for five years. 
Finland Nationality Since 1977, the right to vote and run for local office 
has been extended to nationals of the Nordic Union 
(Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Norway) who are eigh- 
teen years or older, and have met minimum residency 
requirements. 
Sweden Nationality Since 1977, the right to vote and run for local office 
has been extended to nationals of the Nordic Union 
(Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway) who are eigh- 
teen years or older, and have met minimum residency 
requirements. 
France Nationality The rights to vote and run for office are constitution- 
ally reserved for French nationals (Article 3). 
(continued) 
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TABLE 1. (CONTINUED) 
Existing national legislation before the 1994 
Member state Basis for electoral rights local elections directive 
Germany Nationality The rights to vote and run for office are constitution- 
ally reserved for German nationals (Article 20 and 
28[1] of the Basic Law). 
Italy Nationality The rights to vote and run for office are constitution- 
ally reserved for Italian nationals (Articles 48 and 51). 
Belgium Nationality The rights to vote and run for office are constitution- 
ally reserved for Belgian nationals (Article 4). 
Luxembourg Nationality The rights to vote and run for office are constitution- 
ally reserved for Luxembourg nationals (Articles 52 
and 107). 
Greece Nationality The rights to vote and run for office are constitution- 
ally reserved for Greek nationals (Article 51). 
Austria Nationality The rights to vote and run for office are constitution- 
ally reserved for Austrian nationals. 
failing to convince the group on the merits of their special circumstances, each 
reconsidered or dropped their demands. In the counterfactual "diplomacy 101" 
scenario, COREPER sans socialization, this behavior would remain anomalous. 
Second, the alternative explanation would not hypothesize a maximalist inter- 
pretation of Article 8(b) establishing the principle of equal treatment between 
national and nonnational EU citizens in municipal elections. Given the sensitive 
domestic political issues concerning electoral and citizenship laws,83 as well as 
the unanimity decision-rule that applied here, one would expect a much wider accep- 
tance of national derogation and exemption claims than resulted. In short, the "diplo- 
macy 101" model would predict a tendency toward a least-common-denominator 
application of Article 8(b). But as I will show, explaining the bargaining behavior 
of the EU permreps as well as the (maximalist) outcome is not possible without 
reference to how standards of appropriateness and group-community norms to col- 
lectively legitimate arguments are an internalized part of COREPER's collective 
culture. 
83. In fact, Eurobarometer data from this era show no issue-area where EU citizens opposed EU 
action more. Eurobarometer, No. 39, EC, DG X, 1993. Cited in Eurostat 1996, 241. For example: 
% for % against 
Common foreign policy toward countries outside the EU 66 19 
A single currency should replace all the national currencies in the EU by 52 38 
1999 
Each citizen of a country in the EU should have the right to vote in the munici- 48 41 
pal elections of the country in which he/she is resident 
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Relevance of Scope Conditions 
The local elections case provides solid evidence for how scope conditions play a 
role in promoting socialization. The intensity dimension is seen in the complex 
linkages between local elections and the larger political stakes of implementing 
the necessary secondary legislation of the Maastricht Treaty on time. Specifi- 
cally, the treaty set a 31 December 1994 deadline to reach agreement on the 
detailed implementation rules for local voting rights. There was a general percep- 
tion of responsibility among the permreps to reach agreement on a 
directive that would become a key substantive component of the fledgling EU 
citizenship chapter agreed to at Maastricht. This sense of responsibility comes 
out clearly in content analysis of interviews with participants, who claimed there 
was a shared belief that if it was sent to the ministers they would either not reach 
agreement at all or would be unable to "contain" discussions for derogations. A 
protracted stalemate on local elections, a heated debate among the foreign min- 
isters, or a substantively watered-down directive in the scope and terms of appli- 
cation were all scenarios that the EU permreps collectively wanted to avert. Within 
this context, negotiations were both intense and sustained, supporting Hypoth- 
esis 1 (that internalized group-community standards are more likely under such 
conditions). 
The local elections case also illustrates the importance of the second back- 
ground condition: insulation. In this instance, many of the permreps were 
instructed by their capital to keep negotiations at their level and avoid the 
GAC. One official claimed his ambassador's instructions clearly signaled the 
need to "keep it away from the press, where it would have been politicized 
quickly."'84 
Another explained, "We all knew that if the discussion was put 
a certain way we never would reach agreement. Because of the press, pressure 
from national populations, the idea that 'We will be run by foreigners.'"'85 
This supports Stasavage's findings that insulated negotiations are a strategi- 
cally rational institutional design where the risks of posturing run high.86 
The high degree of insulation manufactured to help COREPER "find solutions" 
also clearly supports Hypothesis 2 (that internalized norms are more likely under 
such conditions). Indeed, insulation proved critical to the process of normative 
suasion, seen below in the use of "restricted" sessions to sort out whose pleas 
for special consideration warranted attention. The restricted ambassadors-only 
setting provided a degree of insulation for principled debate and deliberative 
argumentation that other Council bodies, especially the GAC, simply did not 
possess. 
84. Author's interview, 10 May 1996. 
85. Author's interview, 18 April 1997. 
86. Stasavage 2004. 
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Negotiating Derogations: Collective Legitimation and the 
Principle of Equal Treatment 
The most critical stage of negotiations centered on who would receive derogations 
from the scope and application of the directive. The entire agreement hinged on 
this issue, because it would define how extensive coverage was and whether the 
principle of equal treatment would be interpreted in a maximal or minimal sense. 
When the ambassadors began derogation discussions in the fall of 1994, nearly 
half were under instruction to seek special consideration, although the presenta- 
tion of these "special problems" would only be played out over the next seven 
weeks. In particular, six member states would claim serious domestic political dif- 
ficulties: Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Greece, Austria, and Belgium. See Table 2. 
Luxembourg received the earliest support for a derogation, and discussion reiter- 
ated why this was justified, given the high proportion of nonnational Community 
residents-nearly 30 percent of the total electorate.87 There was also the prec- 
edent of the 1993 directive on the right to vote in European Parliament elections, 
where Luxembourg was allowed to set minimum residency requirements of five 
years for nonnational EU voters and ten years for candidates.88 The agreed word- 
ing of the derogation covers a member state where nonnational EU citizens form 
more than 20 percent of the total electorate, effectively limiting the exemption to 
Luxembourg (that is, the 20-percent threshold is not applicable to individual munici- 
palities within member states). But the Luxembourg exception did create a prec- 
edent that other delegations would try to extend to their own "special" problems 
in justifying a case for national derogations. 
Denmark, for example, already allowed all foreign nationals the right to vote in 
local elections after a minimum residency of three years. They therefore wanted 
to extend this residency requirement to nonnational EU citizens as a special clause 
to the directive. But few supported a fixed residency requirement, under the logic 
that Danish nationals were not subject to the same restriction and, it was argued, 
this would violate the principle of equal treatment between national and nonna- 
tional EU citizens.89 
Group discussion led to a consensus that equal treatment should not be enforced 
by sliding scale, whereas justification in the case of Luxembourg could be extended 
by varying degrees to other domestic contexts.90 This argument carried consider- 
able persuasive power, and there is no evidence that Denmark put up much of a 
struggle after failing to sell their case in COREPER. The Danish ambassador kept 
87. In the other member states, the average proportion of nonnational EU residents to nationals 
varied from 0.1 percent (Finland) to 6 percent (Belgium) of the electorate. See Lewis 1998, tab. 5-3, 
222. 
88. Council Directive 93/109/EC. Official Journal L 329/34, 30 December 1993. Following adop- 
tion of the EP voting directive, a number of researchers predicted the local elections directive would 
be more controversial. See, for example, Koslowski 1994, 389; and Oliver 1996, 475, 489. 
89. Author's interview, 21 May 1996. 
90. Author's interviews, 21 May 1996; 18 April 1997; and 18 May 2000. 
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TABLE 2. Derogation arguments for the 1994 local elections directive 
Persuasive Collectively legitimated 
Member state Nature of the problem argument? outcome 
Luxembourg 30 percent of electorate are non- Yes Article 12(1). May establish 
national EU citizens. minimum residency require- 
ments for nonnational EU citi- 
zens, not to exceed the term 
length of the local office in 
question (to vote) and twice 
the term length to stand as can- 
didate. 
Denmark All foreign nationals can vote in No Danish nationals are not sub- 
local elections after meeting a ject to this requirement; would 
residency requirement of three violate the principle of equal 
years; Community nationals treatment between all EU citi- 
should still be required to meet zens. 
this requirement. 
France Certain local offices participate Yes Article 5(4). Allows additional 
in the College des grands dlect- restrictions on local offices 
eurs senatoriaux and have pow- designating delegates who 
ers to elect delegates to the par- vote in or elect members to the 
liamentary assembly. parliamentary assembly. 
In municipalities where more No Violates the principle of equal 
than 20 percent of voters are treatment, and the restriction 
nonnational EU citizens, only 20 of posts to own nationals in 
percent of the seats in the local Article 5(3). 
assembly should be held by such 
nationals. 
Greece Desired extension of the Luxem- No Exemptions should be as 
bourg derogation to the local restricted as possible and are 
level. not applicable to local govern- 
ment units; the Luxembourg 
derogation applies to the 
national level. 
Austria Desired extension of the Luxem- No Exemptions should be as 
bourg derogation to the local restricted as possible. 
level. 
Belgium Territorial division of electorate Yes Article 12(2). May restrict 
into linguistic communities. application of directive to cer- 
tain communes, a list of which 
must be published one year 
before elections are held. 
the reservation on the table until the 7 December session of COREPER, neither 
removing the request for a residency requirement nor pushing very hard for amend- 
ment. Unable to convince others, the Danish delegation dropped their reserve and 
accepted the directive as it stood. Standard bargaining theory would have expected 
something different here, either a tacit or explicit linkage to the "shadow of the 
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veto," or at minimum, a more visible cost-benefit analysis weighing an agreement 
with no residency requirements against the political difficulty of reforming national 
electoral and citizenship legislation. "Diplomacy 101" would also expect to find 
an active campaign by Denmark to support other delegations with similar prefer- 
ences (especially France, Belgium, and possibly Greece and Austria). 
France requested a derogation because of special problems in municipalities 
where mayors had authority to elect Senate delegates. Specifically, the French 
wished to exclude municipal offices with independent powers in Senate elections 
from the scope of the directive. Based on this argument, they received support 
and understanding in COREPER. The group's rationale for accepting the deroga- 
tion was that Article 8b(1) of the Maastricht Treaty clearly delimits the scope of 
voting and participatory rights to the municipal level. 
In addition, the French made a second special request to restrict the directive's 
scope by limiting the number of local seats open to nonnational EU citizens in 
specific municipalities. In October, under pressure from Paris and the political 
signals being sent from the Senate, the French ambassador was instructed to argue 
for a clause limiting the number of seats open to other member states' citizens to 
20 percent in municipalities where more than 20 percent of the electorate were 
nonnational EU citizens.91 The new French proposal suggested the following 
restriction: 
In the basic local government units where the number of voters within the 
scope of Article 3 represents more than 20% of national voters, the Member 
State of residence may limit to this proportion the number of elected repre- 
sentatives who are nationals of other Member States authorized to sit in the 
assemblies of such local authorities.92 
In practical terms, this would have extended the Luxembourg derogation to the 
local level. Greece showed early support for the idea, but the German, Portu- 
guese, Spanish, Italian, and British delegations placed the "gravest reservations" 
on the proposal as a violation of the principle of equal treatment.93 In the course 
of discussing the "quota system" at several different meetings, a majority of ambas- 
sadors spoke in support of rejecting this argument, while others, including the 
French ambassador, remained silent. The ambassadors who found the French request 
unconvincing argued that the derogation would result in a patchy implementation 
of the directive and render the Treaty's objective of endowing EU citizenship with 
distinct rights a hollow shell. The French ambassador, under instruction, kept this 
reservation in place right up until the end, when it was dropped after the lunch 
session of COREPER on 7 December.94 
91. Author's interview, 10 March 1997. 
92. Council Document 8810/94, 7 September 1994, 8. 
93. Author's interviews, 4 and 18 March 1997. 
94. See discussion below. 
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Why the French would drop this reserve requires a two-part explanation, of 
which neither part fits the standard negotiation story. First, the French ambassador 
became convinced that a maximal interpretation of equal treatment was essential 
and the quota system was incompatible with this concept.95 Second and more tell- 
ingly, the French ambassador then went "out on a limb" to convince foreign min- 
istry superiors (who were well aware of the bellwether position of the Senate on 
nonnational citizenship rights) that the quota argument was unconvincing and lacked 
justification.96 Going one step further, below I track how the change in French 
position and quiet removal of the quota proposal, coupled with acceptance of oth- 
ers' derogation claims, shows a clear instance of Type II normative suasion. 
Greece and Austria both experienced difficulties generating understanding for 
their special problems. Both arguments were rejected in COREPER, and each 
shows a dynamic of collective legitimation that the alternative explanation would 
miss because of the irreducible quality of communicative rationality involved. 
Nor can standard negotiation theory explain why the rejectees made no recourse 
to the "shadow of the veto." One rejection came informally and was essentially 
unspoken, while the other required a more dramatic technique. Raised initially at 
the working-group level and during informal bilateral talks, the Greek delegation 
voiced what one group member described as "their hypothetical concern that they 
could have the future obligation to give Turkish citizens the right to vote" should 
Turkey ever become an EU member state.97 But Greece never came out and made 
an argument for a derogation at the group level in COREPER. The Greeks, per- 
haps aware that their argument lacked persuasive power, quietly dropped their 
reserve. 
A similar hypothetical concern was raised by Austria, but this time the group 
relied on a more explicit rejection from the presidency, then held by Germany, to 
delegitimize and even "shame" Austria's claim for special understanding. "They 
were afraid of how the directive would be accepted internally," a group represen- 
tative recalled, "They are afraid of extreme Right movements and they have a 
high standard of living, so it was not easy to explain to them the advantage of the 
directive."98 The Austrian ambassador pressed for a special derogation twice at 
the level of COREPER. The first time, no one said anything in reply. "We just sat 
there and listened," a participant recalled: 
[German Ambassador] von Kyaw [as Chair] waited to see what would hap- 
pen. But the second time Austria raised the issue, von Kyaw was very rough 
to the Austrian Permanent Representative. The Austrian Ambassador said in 
COREPER, "What is the logical argument why you cannot accept our case?" 
Von Kyaw replied very sharply, "We are here meeting very pragmatically, I 
95. Author's interviews, 10 March 1997; 18 May 2000; and 23 May 2000. 
96. Author's interview, 18 May 2000. 
97. Author's interview, 17 February 1997. 
98. Author's interview, 18 March 1997. 
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don't have to explain the logical case to you." He said this very rough and it 
was the last we heard of the Austrian derogation.99 
Interviews at Austria's permanent representation confirm that the group rejection 
was presented back in Vienna as a consensus among the other member states for a 
maximal interpretation of the directive's application, but that the group gave assur- 
ances that a review procedure would enable future reevaluation.100 Austria's "black 
eye" in this case is consistent with the delegation's reputation early in their mem- 
bership for delivering rigid instructions and inflexible policy positions in Brussels. 
It is plausible that differences between the Greek and Austrian appeals to the 
group were partly a function of the latter's noviceness (Austria joined the EU in 
January 1995). One large member state's ambassador with senior status among 
the group summarized Austria's behavior in this case as simply, "they were too 
new." 101 The pattern evidenced here also lends support to Checkel's hypothesis 
that socialization is more likely when agents have fewer ingrained cognitive priors 
and beliefs that are inconsistent with the socializing agency's message.102 While 
it is important to avoid overstating the difference in tact by Greece and Austria, 
the internalized norms argument would account for the difference in argumenta- 
tion by contrasting two delegations at very different stages of membership and 
degrees of internalization.103 
The noviceness argument is also relevant for relating the differential behavior 
of Greece and Austria to what this volume calls role-playing (Type I) socializa- 
tion. As Checkel explains, role-playing socialization involves a process whereby 
an agent learns new roles, acquiring the knowledge to act upon them.1" In this 
instance, one can code Austrian bargaining behavior as too new to act the role, 
compared to Greece's more cautious and informal probing of group support for 
some form of limited exemption. A key question for Type I socialization is how 
does one know what is a socially expected role in a given community setting? 
Austria's bargaining approach shows how such a learning process among newcom- 
ers might work in COREPER, and it represents an important learning experience 
for them to acquire the knowledge to act on a new role. 
Whatever the case, the interviews consistently confirm that the group rejection 
of Austria's demand was a key delimiter in derogation negotiations. Indeed, from 
this point on, a maximal interpretation of equal treatment prevailed. For those who 
still had outstanding derogation claims-including Denmark, France, and Bel- 
gium, as well as Greece's hypothetical and as-yet informal request-the Austrian 
99. Author's interview, 10 March 1997. 
100. Author's interviews, 18 March 1996; and 10 May 1996. 
101. Author's interview, by telephone to national capital, 22 April 2003. 
102. See Checkel, this volume. 
103. An irony here is that few EU specialists would code Greece as an exemplar at internalizing 
EU norms. For an argument that Greece is a laggard in adopting EU norms, see Marks 1997. 
104. Checkel, this volume. 
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rejection served as a marker for the standards by which derogation arguments would 
be measured. 
The final "special" problem was raised by Belgium, which proved to be the 
endgame of derogation talks. Because of cleavages between the French, Dutch, 
and German language communities in Belgium, the directive had the potential to 
alter linguistic majorities within municipalities.1'5 Strategically, the Belgian del- 
egation waited to present their case until the others' arguments had been heard. 
One ambassador recalled that the issue was "How to accept the Belgium problem 
without opening the Pandora's box of Treaty revision?" "We were able to do it in 
COREPER," he added, "but it would have been difficult to do in a crowded, medi- 
acized General Affairs Council." 106 
The Belgian ambassador requested a restricted session to clear the room and 
said, "We will need constitutional changes to transpose this directive and the Flem- 
ish Chamber will not accept it without a derogation." Unlike the other failed der- 
ogation arguments, the Belgian problem was justified with a persuasive argument, 
and one that genuinely convinced the others, even those who were initially skep- 
tical. According to an ambassador from one of the large member states, "An exam- 
ple of persuasion and being convinced was the Belgian derogation on local elections. 
When I first read it, I thought, 'This is stupid.' But I became convinced they had a 
real problem there." 107 
The Belgian derogation was settled the following week over lunch (on 7 Decem- 
ber), again in the restricted, ambassadors-only format. The terms of the deroga- 
tion are included as an annex to the directive. Specifically: 
Belgium states that if it were to make use of the derogation provided for in 
Article 12(2) that derogation would be applied to only some of the local gov- 
ernment units in which the number of voters within the scope of Article 3 
exceeded 20% of all voters where the Belgian government regarded the spe- 
cific situation as justifying an exceptional derogation of that kind.108 
The 7 December lunch included a group discussion of how to explain the Bel- 
gian derogation to their capitals. As one participant explained, "we had a discus- 
sion of the type of arguments we could use back to our capitals to explain why 
this derogation was necessary." 109 The ambassadors from France and Denmark 
agreed to drop their requests for exemption. The Greek and Austrian delegates 
remained quiet. Portugal's ambassador also expressed confidence that Lisbon would 
agree to abstain, despite instructions to reject any derogation. Before restarting 
COREPER after lunch, the ambassadors each telephoned their foreign ministers 
to explain the agreement reached. 
105. de Wilde d'Estmael and Franck 1996, 40. 
106. Author's interview, 18 March 1997. 
107. Author's interview, 18 May 2000. 
108. Official Journal L 386/47, 31 December 1994. 
109. Ibid. 
964 International Organization 
The trickiest conversations were with Paris and Lisbon. The French ambassa- 
dor used his considerable seniority to convince his foreign minister that the direc- 
tive was acceptable. Likewise, the Portuguese ambassador sold the compromise 
reached in COREPER, but only after a lengthy conversation with his foreign min- 
ister. In this case, the minister and ambassador agreed that dissatisfaction with the 
extent of derogations did not warrant the use (or threat) of veto, but instead it was 
decided that Portugal would abstain." 0 Portugal's abstention, rather than use (or 
threat) of the veto, shows how informal norms such as diffuse reciprocity operate 
in the context of COREPER's institutional environment and how they can pro- 
mote pro-norm behavior. Portugal's carefully weighted decision to abstain follow- 
ing detailed communications between the ambassador and foreign minister also 
displays evidence of what this volume calls strategic calculation. Specifically, the 
abstention was a creative solution to signal a difference of view while conforming 
to normative standards and the reasoned consensus, and in the process generating 
potential "social capital" for the future. Abstaining, in this framework of meaning, 
is a "self-binding" form of restraint that can contribute to one's social influence. 
Alternative Explanations Revisited: Internalized Norms or 
Diplomacy 101 ? 
Critical to showing that this goes beyond simple negotiation theory, I found ample 
evidence of how group discussions collectively legitimated some arguments while 
rejecting others. The group actively persuaded delegations with derogation instruc- 
tions to accept a strong interpretation of the principle of equal treatment. In some 
cases persuasion was informal and bilateral, in others it was via strategic interven- 
tions of the German presidency, and sometimes (as in the case of Austria), this 
persuasion was at the collective COREPER level. 
As negotiations reached their final stages, the issue of how to handle the Bel- 
gian argument was contained within COREPER's institutionalized remit to find 
solutions. This differs from the standard logic of two-level games analysis (that is, 
Belgium shows they have "tied hands" to gain a dispensation) because of the social- 
ization component involved. Without the collective legitimation of derogation claims 
by group-community standards, one would have expected the principled commit- 
ment to equal treatment of national and nonnational EU citizens to unravel at this 
stage because of recourse to the veto and the capacity of veto threats to become 
credibly linked to the Belgian exception. If this were all about instrumental ra- 
tionality, relative power, and the formal decision-rule, one would have expected a 
110. As one of the largest "exporters" of EU citizens, Portugal preferred no derogations beyond the 
Luxembourg exception. As such, the Portuguese were skeptical of both the French concession regard- 
ing scope and the limited territorial application for Belgium. An official at Portugal's permrep explained 
that the abstention "was an elegant way to live with the text. It was a special way to avoid disagree- 
ment, but to make a political gesture." Author's interview, 10 March 1997. 
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style of brinkmanship by Denmark, France, Greece, and Austria as the Belgian 
issue lurked in the background and the 31 December deadline loomed. In short, 
one would have seen a different outcome. As the participants saw it, the Belgian 
problem lurked in the background even before the Belgian ambassador asked for 
a partial, flexible derogation; the issue was more how to justify the Belgian excep- 
tion without opening the Pandora's box of special dispensations for any member 
with sensitive national concerns. Reaching a normative consensus on acceptable 
derogations was based on group-community standards of fairness, and included 
obligations of appropriate self-restraint for those delegations who lacked persua- 
sive arguments (which helps account for the complete lack of veto threats, even 
among "exporter" states such as Portugal). 
In the case of Austria's argument, the instrumental rationale ("Why can't the 
group explain the logical case to us") not only failed, but group norms were used 
to shame the Austrian position and delegitimize the argument as unacceptable. 
The Belgian ambassador, widely considered the doyen of COREPER during the 
late 1980s and 1990s, used his considerable argumentative resources to convince 
the others that the derogation would be of a closed nature, and used as sparingly 
as possible. The Belgian derogation unambiguously demonstrates the power of 
persuasion and role of argumentative rationality in everyday EU decision making: 
a small state with a "good" argument convinced the others, some of whom were 
initially skeptical, to accept their claim and in a few cases "go out on a limb" to 
sell the agreed results back home to the capital. 
The local elections example thus offers empirical support for the internalized 
norms argument, and the case evidence displays both Type I and Type II charac- 
teristics. Type I internalization-rule-following behavior based on socially expected 
standardsll"-can be seen in the way those with unconvincing derogation claims 
dropped their demands. This includes Denmark, Greece, Austria, and France on 
quotas. Evidence of Type I internalization can also be seen in the nonaction of 
"exporter" states such as Portugal, who logically preferred no derogations at all, 
but displayed none of the instrumental calculative reasoning (including any hint 
of recourse to veto rights) that would be expected in the standard bargaining expla- 
nation. Portugal's abstention is more consistent with the logic of appropriateness 
and socially accepted standards to avoid blockage of the group's "reasoned con- 
sensus" around partial, limited exemption for Belgium, France (on mayoral can- 
didates), and Luxembourg. 
Type II internalization-accepting group-community standards as "the right thing 
to do" 112-is evidenced by the "reasoned consensus" legitimating Belgium's plea 
for special consideration. The strongest evidence of Type II normative suasion can 
be seen in the actions of the French ambassador. Carefully triangulated interview 
histories support a characterization that he was genuinely persuaded by his Bel- 
111. See Checkel, this volume. 
112. Ibid. 
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gian colleague's argument, after initial doubts, and then went on to convince his 
superiors in Paris to accept Belgium's partial exemption while at the same time 
dropping the French preference for a quota system. According to the key partici- 
pants involved, this action was premised on becoming convinced that helping 
Belgium was the right thing to do. As one ambassador put it, "we found under- 
standing in our capitals ... in the end we persuaded our governments, we did it 
very much for Belgium." 113 
In summary, the local elections case offers evidence that COREPER socializa- 
tion affects not only strategies, but also conceptions of the self. Evidence of an 
expanded conception of the self, in which permreps practice internalized group- 
community standards based on a noncalculative logic of appropriateness, can be 
seen in both the bargaining behavior and outcome of the local elections case. The 
interview and case-study data offer confirming evidence for the four socialization 
measures discussed in section two. First, I have shown noninstrumental self- 
restraint among several delegations after they failed to convince the others of their 
argument (including Denmark, France, and Greece). Second, there were numerous 
examples of self-enforcing adherence to informal norms, such as the "self-control" 
of derogation claimants to not explicitly reference veto options or drop reserves 
based on favorable cost-benefit ratios. Third, evidence of empathy and other- 
regarding behavior not linked to calculative reasoning can be seen in the "rea- 
soned consensus" to legitimate Belgium's derogation claim even though several 
ambassadors had to sell the validity of Belgium's case to their superiors while 
dropping their own claims. Fourth, and finally, this case illustrates the limits on 
instrumentalism through the collective legitimation of arguments. Restricted ses- 
sions were used to collectively accept and reject derogation claims (and "plot" 
ways to sell the Belgian derogation to ministers) around a shared understanding of 
maximal interpretation of equal treatment. As a result, the internalized norms argu- 
ment can more fully account for the way in which Denmark, France, and Greece 
quietly dropped, or chose not to articulate, derogation claims than can "diplomacy 
101." More dramatically, the group rejection of Austria's claim demonstrates how 
collective legitimation places limits on instrumental behavior by signaling that cer- 
tain behavior is just not acceptable. In sum, the constructivist logic of internalized 
norms can better account for both the bargaining behavior and outcomes of the 
local elections case than the rationalist logic of consequences alone. 
Conclusion: Blurring the National and the European 
COREPER's institutional architecture challenges the conventional dichotomy that 
sharply demarcates the national and European levels. As a collectivity of member- 
state representatives, COREPER exemplifies the imagery of national and Euro- 
113. Author's interview, by telephone to national capital, 22 April 2003. 
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pean levels of governance becoming amalgamated."14 Accordingly, COREPER's 
Janus-like design is an anomaly for theorists who draw rigid distinctions between 
"national" and "supranational" agency. For example, in one prominent account 
of European integration, the corporate body of "supranational entrepreneurs" in 
the EU is effectively limited to European Commissioners."5 But the EU perm- 
reps belie such a straightforward pigeonhole. As Wallace puts it, "It would be a 
caricature of this intricate policy process to counterpose national actors and supra- 
national entrepreneurs as separate elites, promoting opposed interests." 116 The 
permreps who participate in weekly COREPER negotiations and share a collec- 
tive responsibility to maintain the output of the Council as a whole, nicely illus- 
trate how the logics of consequences and appropriateness can interface, which in 
turn suggests that national and supranational identifications can become com- 
plexly intertwined. According to March and Olsen, "Political actors ... calculate 
consequences and follow rules, and the relationship between the two is often 
subtle." 117 
Perhaps surprisingly, permreps do not self-reflectively see these as competitive 
or contradictory role/identity sets. My findings are somewhat at odds with others 
in this volume, such as Beyers and Hooghe, who offer clear-cut evidence of ranked 
"primary" and "secondary" allegiances among EU officials."" A major difference, 
of course, is the point of reference: they are examining the administrative expert 
level of Council working groups and Commission officials, and both of these dis- 
play qualitative differences from COREPER in scope conditions as well as what 
Egeberg refers to as "organizational characteristics." 119 
The testimonies of the permreps interviewed for this project suggest that iden- 
tities and role conceptions are not so clearly juxtaposed at this level of the EU 
system. Overall, the evidence points to a pattern of symbiosis between national 
and collective identities.120 The EU permreps have operationalized the concept 
of "double-hatting." 121 Instead of limited notions of shifts and transfers of iden- 
tity, or clearly juxtaposed primary and secondary affiliations, what one sees in 
COREPER is a cognitive blurring of the sharp definitional boundaries between 
the national and the European. None of this implies national identities are becom- 
ing marginalized; rather, what stands out is the interpenetration of the national 
114. H. Wallace 2000, 7. 
115. Moravcsik 1998, 54-60, 479-85. 
116. W. Wallace 2000, 529-30. 
117. March and Olsen 1998, 952. 
118. See Beyers, this volume; and Hooghe, this volume. See also Egeberg 1999; and Egeberg, 
Schaefer, and Trondal 2003. 
119. Egeberg 2004. 
120. The symbiosis analogy is a trademark of some of the subtler findings (now often overlooked) 
in the early neofunctionalist literature on the ECSC and EEC. See Haas 1958, 526; and Lindberg and 
Scheingold 1970, 94-95. 
121. See Laffan 2004, 90-94, for a conceptual discussion of "double hatting" among Council actors. 
I also thank the editors for suggesting this point. 
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with the European and vice versa.122 The identity configuration of the EU perm- 
reps is compatible with what Risse suggestively describes as a "marble cake" 
concept of multiple identities, in which "the various components of an individual's 
identity cannot be neatly separated on different levels." 123 On this reading, an 
actor's "identity components influence each other" and "mesh and blend." 124 Nor 
does this in any way imply that socialization effects are homogenous.125 A more 
systematic study of socialization processes in COREPER would build controls 
into the model for variation caused by preexisting differences in member states' 
European policy, administrative culture, and policy styles.'26 
Finally, it is worth further consideration how the socialization effects identified 
in this article are potentially reversible. That is to say, the Brussels-based culture 
of decision making, endowed with dense informal norms and standards of appro- 
priateness, could be undone. First, there is little, if any, evidence to support a "holis- 
tic" internalization thesis in which norm compliance becomes automatic.'27 Rather, 
COREPER socialization is a process of incremental, partial internalization. This 
point is evidenced more clearly in my larger multiple-case-study project, where 
the British, for example, display a more a la carte adherence to informal norms 
when there are principled objections to EU policies (as in social policy).128 
This study did find hard evidence of Type II internalization,129 particularly in 
the way those with rejected derogation claims convinced their capitals and/or "went 
out on a limb" to secure the Belgian derogation once a "reasoned consensus" was 
reached in COREPER-contrary to what standard bargaining theory and instru- 
mental cost-benefit predictions would have expected. But it does not necessarily 
follow that a switch from a logic of consequences is complete: just ask the British 
if they could find someone else's argument on fiscal federalism convincing, or the 
French if policy toward the Middle East is open to EU deliberation and collective 
legitimation norms. In other words, it would be inaccurate to characterize the inter- 
nalization of group-community standards as "taken-for-granted" in a holistic sense, 
but the bargaining behavior and decisional outcomes documented in this article 
do consistently confirm instances of pro-norm behavior as the "right thing to do." 
Second, it is possible to imagine scenarios in which the scope conditions for 
this socialization story were fundamentally altered: either the density of issue cov- 
erage (for example, due to the increased fragmentation of preparatory authority 
122. For a conceptualization of how "the European dimension is included in national self- 
conceptions," see Waever 1995, 412, 430. For a detailed case study on Germany, see Katzenstein 1997. 
123. Risse 2004, 251. 
124. Ibid., 251-52. 
125. See Legro 1997 for a discussion of how pro-norm behavior may exist in "varying strengths" 
within a given community. 
126. For a detailed analysis of how socialization is affected by domestic organizational embedded- 
ness, see Beyers, this volume. 
127. On "holistic" internalization, see Hurd 1999, 398. 
128. Lewis 1998. 
129. See Checkel, this volume. 
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among rival committees) or insulation (for example, because of domestic political 
pressures to address the "democratic deficit" and increase transparency). Chang- 
ing the scope conditions would likely alter what neofunctionalists called l'engrenage 
effects,'30 and it is quite possible that the standards of appropriateness would be 
altered as a result. Under altered background conditions or changes in the stan- 
dards of appropriateness,131 one would expect the identity configuration of EU 
permreps to revert to more egoistic and instrumental variants. Under such condi- 
tions, pro-norm behavior would become contingent on more explicit and regular- 
ized calculation, and agents might use voting weights and veto threats rather than 
appeals to fairness or principled debate that would, over time, affect the perceived 
legitimacy of the EU's collective decision-making culture. 
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